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Abstract
Do individuals marry and divorce for economic reasons? Can we measure the economic attrac-
tiveness of a person’s marriage market? We answer these questions using a structural model
of consumer-producer households that is applied to rich data from Malawi. Using revealed
preference conditions for a stable marriage market, we define the economic attractiveness of a
potential match as the difference between the potential value of consumption and leisure with the
new partner and the value of consumption and leisure in the current marriage. We estimate this
marital instability measure for every possible pair in geographically defined marriage markets in
2010. We find that the marital instability measure is predictive of future divorces, particularly
for women. We further show that this estimated effect on divorce is mitigated by the woman’s
age, and by a lack of men, relative to women, in the marriage market, showing that these factors
interact with the economic attractiveness of the remarriage market. These findings provide out-
of-sample validation of our model and evidence that the economic value of the marriage market
matters for divorce decisions.
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1 Introduction
Becker (1973, 1974) convincingly argued that the institution of marriage can be analyzed by
means of modern microeconomic theory. In his ground-breaking work, as well as in subse-
quent work by Becker, Landes and Michael (1977), the concept of the marriage market is
introduced, which rests on the simple but powerful assumption that individuals are rational
utility maximizers who compete as they seek mates. This framework implies that each indi-
vidual looks for the best mate subject to the restrictions imposed by the marriage market.
An important concept in this theory is gains to marriage, which depend on a given union
as well as the opportunities provided by the marriage market as a whole. While compan-
ionship and the production of children are important components of marital gains, there are
also considerable economic gains to marriage, such as the sharing of public goods and the
division of labor within unions (see Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2014, for an extensive
discussion).
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between the economic gains of marriage with
respect to household production and consumption decisions, and divorce and remarriage.
More specifically, individuals seek to find the best match in the marriage market, and better
outside options in terms of one’s marriage market will affect intrahousehold sharing in the
current match, and subsequent divorce, if opportunities on the marriage market dominate the
allocation of consumption and time in the current marriage. We provide a structural measure
of the value of an individual’s remarriage market, based on a robust revealed preference
approach, and show that it predicts future divorce, in an out-of-sample test of the model.
This suggests that our quantification of marriage (in)stability can be an attractive tool to
further guide the extensive literature on the drivers and consequences of divorce (see, e.g.,
Amato, 2010, for a review).
In estimating our model, we fix our attention on households in Malawi, a context where
divorce is common and remarriage is socially acceptable. Lifetime divorce probabilities are
between 40% and 65%, and remarriage is almost universal: within two years of divorce, over
40% of women remarry, with this figure reaching almost 90% after ten years (Reniers, 2003;
see also the discussion in Section 2). Marriages also tend to happen within neighboring
villages, which allows the accurate definition of marriage markets. This is essential for
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obtaining reliable estimates of the value of individuals’ marriage markets. Finally, our focus
on Malawi allows us to specifically investigate drivers of divorce in a developing country,
whereas existing empirical work has mostly focused on developed countries.
Model. Our model combines three spheres of household decision-making. A first element
is the income generated by household production, which is directly related to economies of
scale and risk sharing opportunities provided by a marriage. Next, we introduce individ-
ual preferences over private and public goods (inside the household), which captures both
unequal sharing of private goods and economic gains of jointly consuming public goods.
Heterogeneity between husband and wife in these preferences correlates with unequally dis-
tributed gains of marriage and/or divorce. Finally, we focus on rational partner choice on
the marriage market, meaning that the value of a given marriage is compared to the value
of being single or marrying someone else.
In recent work, Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017a) focus on the last
two elements. That is, they analyze the impact of gains from public goods and the marriage
market on the intrahousehold distribution of resources. These authors combine the static
collective model of household consumption (Chiappori, 1988, 1992) with the assumption of
a stable marriage market, the latter relating directly to the ideas in Becker (1973, 1974) and
Becker, Landes and Michael (1977). Based on the potential income in the counterfactual
situation and the value of the consumption bundle in the current marriage, the model quan-
tifies the outside options of a myopic spouse and subsequently relates this to that spouse’s
share of household resources (in the current marriage). These outside options improve with
one’s productivity, which implies that the marriage market can explain the widely observed
positive relationship between wages and the share of household resources consumed (see,
e.g., Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir, 2007, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen,
2012, and Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel and Vermeulen, 2015).
Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2013) do not reject the implications of the static col-
lective model among Malawi households, which allows them to identify the intrahousehold
sharing of resources. However, they do not explicitly model the marriage market nor do they
model a household’s agricultural production, which is essential in the context of Malawi
(see Section 2 for more details), and more generally in a developing context. Therefore we
extend the framework of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017a) by present-
ing a structural model of consumer-producer households that integrates economic gains to
marriage, both in terms of public goods and the division of labor in household production,
and that accounts for the intrahousehold allocation of resources in the context of a marriage
market (see also Apps and Rees, 1996, and Chiappori, 1997).
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To obtain a tractable model that combines all these features of household decision mak-
ing, we adopt a static perspective (ignoring intertemporal aspects of household decisions)
and we assume stability on the marriage market. Importantly, however, this is not neces-
sarily in contradiction with the widespread observation that households divorce. It simply
implies that myopic individuals do not take into account future shocks (e.g., related to indi-
vidual preferences, labor productivity, remarriage opportunities, . . . ) that may change their
current (and future) choices. Static models are popular in the literature (see, e.g., Browning,
Chiappori and Weiss, 2014) and can be considered as a building block for more advanced
models that focus on the intertemporal aspects of household decisions (see, e.g., Chiappori
and Mazzocco, 2017, for a recent review). Also, it is important to note that our model
performs remarkably well empirically: there is no a priori mechanical reason to expect the
predictive power on future divorces that we document.
Empirical findings. Our model yields two structural measures of the value of an indi-
vidual’s outside options, which we term marital instability indices : the first index captures
how much better off (in consumption terms) the individual would be if single (the Individual
Rationality (IR) index), while the second index measures how much better off the individual
would be if he/she remarried another individual in the same marriage market (the Block-
ing Pair (BP) index). After computing the BP index for each possible pair within each
marriage market, we then take the maximum of an individual’s set of BP indices to obtain
an estimate of the economic value of the (re)marriage market that reflects the individual’s
most attractive remarriage option.1 We estimate these instability indices for each married
individual in the first wave of our data (2010).
Using the 2013 wave of the dataset, we are able to observe if the individual has subse-
quently divorced. If individuals have divorced by 2013, this indicates that they experienced
an important shock between 2010 and 2013; for example, a change in the economic opportu-
nities on the marriage market, or a deterioration of match quality in the marriage. We link
our measures of instability to these observed subsequent divorces, which sheds light on the
relationship between economic gains to marriage (as defined in our model) and divorce. This
also implies an out-of-sample test of the validity of our structural model. Note that this does
not imply that there is no room for renegotiation between spouses after a negative shock
occurs (see also Voena, 2015, Bronson, 2015 and Reynoso, 2018). Rather, our interpretation
is that if the couple is highly unstable according to our measures, then there is less room for
renegotiation. A big negative shock then results in divorce if the negative shock cannot be
1We also consider the average of an individual’s BP indices, and the 95th percentile of an individual’s
BP indices, with very similar results - see Section 6.
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internalized through a substantial change of the intrahousehold bargaining positions. This
interpretation is also in line with the structural analysis of Lise and Yamada (2018).
We find that the wife’s BP index significantly predicts subsequent divorce. In particular,
a 1 percentage point increase in the wife’s BP index, as a proportion of her household
income, raises the probability of divorce by 1.4 percentage points on average. This is an
economically significant effect, as the per-year divorce probability is 8.5%.2 Interestingly,
this significant association cannot be explained by spouses’ wages, land income or nonlabor
income which, alongside intrahousehold sharing, are the key determinants of the BP index in
the structural model. This suggests that intrahousehold sharing plays an important role in
the gains to marriage and divorce. As an extension to these results, we also estimate a model
that allows the instability indices to have a different effect on divorcing and remaining single,
and divorcing and remarrying. Crucially, we find that the wife’s BP index is significantly
associated with the wife divorcing and remarrying, but not divorcing and remaining single.
This is consistent with the intuition that the BP index captures the attractiveness of options
on the remarriage market. Therefore, we find that a model-based measure of individuals’
outside options on the marriage market correlates with out-of-sample realizations of divorce.
Relation to the literature. Our paper makes two key contributions to the literature.
First, from a methodological point of view, it significantly extends the theoretical model in
Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017a) by also accounting for the economic
gains of production decisions in modeling households’ behavior. This is particularly relevant
for consumer-producer households in developing countries, for which agricultural production
activities are prevalent (see, for example, Udry, 1996, Apps and Rees, 1996, Chiappori, 1997,
and Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, Udry, 2014 and Walther, 2018). A distinguishing feature of
our approach is that it belongs to a revealed preference tradition that is free of any para-
metric assumptions, and optimally allows for heterogeneity in preferences and production
technologies. See Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982) for
early contributions on the revealed preference analysis of household consumption behavior,
and Afriat (1972) and Varian (1984) for the analysis of production behavior. More recently,
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2009, 2011) have extended this seminal work
towards the analysis of households in the framework of a collective model. Finally, and im-
portantly from a methodological point of view, our revealed preference methods allow us to
estimate shadow wages and land prices, which are often missing or suffer from measurement
error in empirical applications. As such, we obtain an empirically tractable model that can
2Modeling divorce as a simple Markov process, and using the proportions of individuals currently married
and divorced in the dataset and the remarriage probabilities in Reniers (2003), implies an annual divorce
probability of 8.5%.
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be applied to a context with consumer-producer households to study household choices and
the role of the marriage market.
Second, our empirical application contributes a unique perspective to the active literature
on the economic drivers of divorce. Many studies focus on the role of shocks in a reduced form
approach. For example, unemployment (Charles and Stephens, 2004, Doiron and Mendolia,
2011, and Eliason, 2012), shocks to earnings capacity (Weiss and Willis, 1997), television
access (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009), changes in house prices (Farnham, Schmidt and Sevak,
2011), and lottery winnings (Hankins and Hoekstra, 2011), to name a few, have all been
shown to correlate significantly with subsequent divorce. Structural (parametric) models
also make more precise the mechanisms behind divorce decisions, but have rather tended
to focus on learning about match quality, or the role of policy changes (Brien, Lillard and
Stern, 2006, Bruze, Svarer and Weiss, 2015, Voena, 2015, Bronson, 2015, Goussé, Jacquemet
and Robin, 2017, Reynoso, 2018).
Our paper breaks new ground in the literature on divorce in three important ways. First,
we combine a structural and reduced form approach, using a structural model to provide
a theoretical underpinning to the value of an individual’s outside option on the marriage
market, and a reduced form approach to correlate this measure with subsequent divorces.
The latter step provides an out-of-sample validity test of our structural model, which is
rather unique. Second, we provide empirical evidence of the well-known intuition that out-
side options, and in particular the value of one’s remarriage market, matter for divorce
decisions, while accounting for full heterogeneity in individual preferences, individuals’ bar-
gaining power and households’ technologies. This is a crucial difference between our work
and studies such as Voena (2015), Bronson (2015) and Reynoso (2018), which are based on
strong parametric assumptions with respect to individuals’ preferences, bargaining power
and economies of scale. Of course, the latter analyses are richer in some other aspects (most
notably, dynamic aspects), which makes our study complementary to these other studies.
Third, our findings on the role of outside opportunities in triggering divorce complement
models where match quality plays an important role in marriage and divorce decisions: indi-
viduals can be thought of as matching primarily for economic reasons, but high match quality
can compensate for economic “mismatch”. However, when match quality erodes, individu-
als search for a better economic match, and so divorce when there are more economically
attractive individuals available in their marriage market (see, e.g., Chiappori, Radchenko
and Salanié, 2018, who use economic and non-economic measures of match quality to pre-
dict divorce). In fact, we find that match quality matters in addition to our measures of
economic gains on the marriage market. For example, we find that the estimated effect of
the value of the remarriage market on divorce is mitigated when spouses are older, and is
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reduced when spouses are assortatively matched on age. The latter result relates to find-
ings on the importance of assortative matching in marriage (see, e.g., Hitsch, Hortacsu and
Ariely, 2010, Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and Santos, 2014, and Chiappori, Oreffice and
Quintana-Domeque, 2017). Finally, and consistent with the literature, the sex ratio is an
important determinant of outside options: the relative attractiveness of women’s remarriage
opportunities turns out to be less predictive of divorce when there are fewer men relative to
women in her marriage market (Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2012).
Structure. The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 describes the context of
Malawi, which motivates the structure of our model and the empirical analysis. Section
3 introduces our revealed preference methodology for analyzing the stability of marriage.
Here, we also define our IR and BP indices for marriage stability. In Section 4 we discuss
the dataset and explain how we construct marriage markets. Section 5 presents summary
statistics of the main outcomes of our structural model. These results motivate our key
empirical analysis in Section 6, in which we focus on the empirical relationship between the
economic gains to matches (captured by our structural IR and BP indices) and divorce and
remarriage probabilities. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix presents the proofs of our
results and the online Appendices provide additional information and empirical results.
2 Malawian context
Malawi is a poor country in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a GDP per capita of $226 in 2013
(World Bank). It ranks 174th out of 187 countries on the 2014 Human Development Index,
with an average life expectancy of 55.3 years. The proportion of females with secondary
school education is low, at 10.4%. Households in Malawi primarily engage in subsistence
agricultural production, with smallholder plots in the region of 0.2-3 hectares (Bignami-Van
Assche et al., 2011, Ellis, Kutengule and Nyasulu, 2003). Land is largely passed on through
inheritance, often at the time of marriage, and determined by descent, which can be matri-
lineal or patrilineal (Walther, 2018). The predominant crop grown is maize, and agricultural
production involves the joint labor supply of husbands and wives (see Walther, 2017, for
more information on labor supply). Individuals’ primary assets, and thus determinants of
outside options, are their landholdings and capacity for labor supply. These features make
it important to take account of households’ agricultural production when considering their
decision-making.
There are two key reasons why we choose this context to examine the role of economic
factors in divorce. First, Malawi is characterized by high divorce rates. Marriage is almost
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universal (Reniers, 2003), with over 99% of women and 97% of men having married at
least once by the age of 30 (Demographic Health Survey Report, 2004). Early marriage
is common, with the median age of first marriage at 18 for women and 23 for men (DHS
Report, 2004). However, marriage is also unstable, with almost half of all marriages ending
within twenty years, a figure much higher than in other African countries, and similar to
present-day figures for the U.S. (Reniers, 2003). In this sense, Malawi is characterized by a
high turnover of marriages and divorces. One driver of the high divorce rate is that divorce is
easy to obtain: spouses seeking divorce need only state that there is no love remaining in the
marriage (Mwambene, 2005), so that divorce is unilateral. Although data on who triggers
divorce is lacking, there do not appear to be gender asymmetries in divorce rates - see also
Table 1 below. An important observation when applying our model is that remarriage is also
common, with 40% of women remarrying within two years. Thus, Malawi is characterized by
an ease of moving between marriage and divorce, which is consistent with the assumptions
of our model presented in Section 3, with no frictions on the marriage market and where
outside options are determined by utility on divorce.
Second, marriage is local. Approximately 45% of married individuals are from the village
they live in, while a further 25% are from another village within the same district (Malawi
IHS 2010). This allows us to be precise about defining the marriage markets within which
divorced individuals can look for potential remarriage partners. In particular, we use ge-
ographic information about households to construct marriage markets - we discuss this in
detail in Section 4.
To get a sense of the reasons for divorce given by individuals in Malawi, Table I shows
responses given by men and women in the 2008 wave of the Malawi Longitudinal Study
of Families and Health (University of Pennsylvania) to the question: What was the main
reason your marriage ended? Respondents gave a complete history of their marriages and
divorces. The modal response across both men and women is “lack of love”. However,
unfaithfulness of the spouse is the next most common reason, and is also closely related to
the answer “Spouse married someone else”, as both involve the presence of an alternative
partner. Combining these two categories implies that among men, approximately 43% of
divorces occurred due to the presence of another partner, while among women, this figure is
42%. It is interesting to note that while HIV prevalence is high in Malawi and argued to be
an important parameter for partner choice (Greenwood, Kircher, Santos and Tertilt, 2019),
the percentage of individuals reporting this as a reason for divorce is close to zero.
8
Table I. Reasons for divorce, responses in 2008 Malawi Longitudinal Survey of Families and
Health
Men Women
Lack of love 28.7% 31.5%
Spouse unfaithful 35.8% 21.9%
Spouse did not provide 4.8% 9.6%
Spouse married someone else 7.5% 20.2%
Respondent unfaithful 5.9% 3.6%
Suspected spouse of having HIV 0% 0.2%
Other 17.3% 13.0%
# Recorded divorces 734 977
# Recorded marriages 2566 3186
% Marriages ending in divorce 28.6 30.7
This table shows the reported reasons for divorce for all observed divorces as of the 2008 wave of the
Malawi Longitudinal Survey of Families and Health.
3 Consumption, production and marriage stability
Our method for measuring the instability of marriage takes as a starting point the model
of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017a). These authors define a revealed
preference characterization of household consumption under stable marriage to analyze the
intrahousehold allocation of resources and the gains to marriage in terms of public goods.
A novel feature of our analysis is that we integrate household production in this revealed
preference framework, thus explicitly linking productivity to marriage decisions.
As explained in Section 2, agricultural production is an important dimension of house-
hold decisions in developing countries, and Malawi in particular. It is the primary source of
livelihood and a crucial determinant of outside options. Moreover, our structural modeling of
household production allows us to use shadow wages and land prices in our analysis of mar-
riage stability. This is particularly important in view of our aim to accurately estimate the
value of an individual’s marriage market. The majority of households in Malawi do not per-
form market work, which means that observed market wages are likely to be upward biased
relative to the distribution of wage offers, and will upward bias the estimated productivity
of individuals and their value on the marriage market. Our method circumvents this issue
by estimating each individuals’ productivity on the land, which is a more accurate measure
of economic attractiveness for farming households. This also indicates the usefulness of our
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model for other settings where individual’s productivity on the land is an important factor.
One limitation of our model is that consumption and production decisions are separable
from each other. This assumption has been rejected in some developing countries (see, e.g.,
Duflo and Udry, 2004, for the case of Côte d’Ivoire), although recent work on intrahouse-
hold allocation in Malawi finds behavior consistent with separability (Walther, 2018, and
Rangel and Thomas, 2019). Nonseparable consumption and production decisions make the
nonparametric identification of models like ours notoriously difficult (see, e.g., Pollak and
Wachter, 1975). At this point, the benefits of a relatively easily implementable nonparamet-
rically identified structural model seem to outweigh the potential advantages of nonseparable
consumption and production decisions that require strong parametric assumptions to obtain
identification.
3.1 Notation and components of the structural model
We focus on the marriage stability of couples that consist of a female a and a male b. In what
follows, we will often refer to individual i = a, b. Let A be a finite set of females and B a finite
set of males. The marriage market is defined by a matching function σ : A ∪ B → A ∪ B.
This function satisfies, for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
σ (a) ∈ B, σ (b) ∈ A,
σ (a) = b ∈ B if and only if σ (b) = a ∈ A.
In words, the function σ assigns to every female or male a partner of the other gender (i.e.
σ (a) = b and σ (b) = a). For simplicity we will assume in this methodological section
that |A| = |B|, which means that all individuals are matched. Actually, it is relatively
straightforward to formally include singles in the models below.3 However, unless there is a
shortage on one side of the marriage market, rationalizing the behavior of singles requires
an explicit model for frictions on the marriage market, or marriage costs. To focus our
discussion, we abstract from these extensions in the theoretical framework, but we allow
potential matches to be formed between married individuals and singles in the marriage
market in the empirical analysis, so that empirically we allow for the possibility that |A| 6=
|B|.
Each individual i is assumed to spend his or her total time endowment (denoted by T ∈
R+) on leisure (li ∈ R+), market work (mi ∈ R+) and agricultural work on the household’s
3Specifically, some of the variables in Propositions 1 and 2 (individual quantities, share of nonlabor
income and shadow wages) must be set equal to zero in the case of singles. But the basic structure of the
rationalizability conditions in the propositions remains intact.
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land (denoted by hi ∈ R+). The individual’s budget constraint for time is
T = mi + hi + li.
The price of time is individual i’s wage, which we represent by wi ∈ R++.
To model agricultural production, we assume that there are three types of inputs: the
individuals’ time spent on agricultural labor (ha and hb), land (L ∈ R+) and other inputs
(x ∈ R+; for example, fertilizer). To take our Malawian context into account, we distinguish
between land belonging to the female (La ∈ R+), land belonging to the male (Lb ∈ R+) and
joint “household” land (L(a,b) ∈ R+):
L = La + Lb + L(a,b).
The first two types of land are assignable in the post-divorce allocation, while this typically
is not the case for jointly owned land. For a given match (a, b), we assume a common price
for the three land types, so that the price of La, Lb and L(a,b) is given by z(a,b) ∈ R++.
The price is pair-specific to allow for different values of land, reflecting for instance different
qualities of land, scarcity, etc. The other input x is assumed to be a Hicksian aggregate with
a price that is normalized to unity. The inputs are transformed into an output y ∈ R+ by
means of an agricultural production function F
(
ha, hb, L, x
)
. We assume that this function
is increasing in its arguments and characterized by constant returns to scale (in line with
Pollak and Wachter, 1975). The output associated with agricultural production is again
a Hicksian aggregate, with a price that is normalized to unity. Note that we make the
assumption that agricultural production is marketable. As such, it is associated with an
exogenous normalized price (see also Chiappori, 1997). The household is further associated
with nonlabor income n(a,b) ∈ R+.
The total income of a household consists of income from market work, agricultural pro-
duction and nonlabor income. It is allocated to a Hicksian aggregate good with a price
that is normalized to unity. This Hicksian aggregate is used for the private consumption of
both spouses (denoted by qa, qb ∈ R+) and the household’s consumption of a public good
(denoted by Q ∈ R+). Examples of private goods are food and clothing, while an example of
a public good is expenditure on children. Importantly, the household’s consumption of the
private good, for example food, equals the sum of the food bought at the market and food
produced at home when the household produces less than it consumes, and equals a share
of the home produced food when the household produces more than it consumes. Further,
by including public consumption, our model effectively captures economies of scale in con-
sumption, which form a prime economic motivation for marriage (in addition to household
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(agricultural) production).
Finally, each individual i is assumed to derive utility from leisure, private consumption
as well as public consumption. The preferences of individual i are represented by a utility
function U i (li, qi, Q) that is assumed to be continuous, concave and strictly increasing in
leisure li and private consumption qi, and increasing in public consumption Q. Note that
the individual heterogeneity in these preferences, for instance with respect to public goods,
are directly related to the unequal distribution of the gains of marriage or divorce.
3.2 Marriage stability: theoretical characterization
We now define a stable marriage allocation. We say that an allocation is stable if it satisfies
three equilibrium conditions.
Our first two equilibrium conditions relate to the households’ production and consump-
tion behavior. At the production level, we closely follow the set-up of Chiappori (1997) and








ha, hσ(a), L, x
)
.
This formulation of the household’s optimization problem makes clear that it is not relevant
who owns the land for the production decisions (as L (= La + Lσ(a) + La,σ(a)) is used as
the argument of the household’s production function). The household jointly decides on
the optimal level of all inputs, including the total amount of land that is used. At this
point, we note that profit maximization is arguably a strong assumption, particularly for
agricultural household production in developing countries (see, e.g., Udry, 1996). Therefore,
in our following analysis we will allow for possible deviations from exact profit maximizing
behavior. These deviations may be interpreted as reflecting cross-household variation in
production technologies or productive efficiencies.
At the consumption level, we adopt the collective approach of Chiappori (1988, 1992,
1997) and assume that within-household allocations are Pareto efficient. Formally, this
means that every matched couple (a, σ (a)) is using a two-step procedure. In the first step, the
households select a profit maximizing input-output combination (denoted by the subindex
12
∗) and, in the second step, they choose a consumption allocation that solves
max
la,lσ(a),qa,qσ(a),Q







wala + wσ(a)lσ(a) + qa + qσ(a) +Q ≤
waT + wσ(a)T + n(a,σ(a)) + y∗ − waha∗ − wσ(a)hσ(a)∗ − z(a,σ(a))L∗ − x∗,
where µ represents the Pareto weight of male σ (a) relative to female a.
At this point, it is worth highlighting a few important aspects of our representation of the
households’ production and consumption behavior. Most notably, problem (2) makes explicit
how the two decision steps are connected. The optimal decision taken in the first (production)
step transforms part of the household’s resources into the marketable good y∗, which in turn
can be used to consume the quantities qa, qσ(a) and Q in the second (consumption) step.
Next, our structural model assumes interior solutions for both the production problem (1)
and the consumption problem (2). In case couples spend their time on both market work and
agricultural work, this implies that prices line up exactly (for these couples). In our empirical
application, reliable data for input prices and wages will be missing. As we will explain in
Section 3.4, we remedy this problem by making use of shadow prices and wages which
guarantee that our assumptions of optimizing behavior hold. Finally, the Pareto weights in
(2) are in general not constant. For instance, they will typically vary with wages or marriage
market characteristics (such as sex ratios). Attractively, these Pareto weights capture the
intrahousehold sharing of resources: a higher value for µ implies that the household decisions
reflect to a greater degree male σ(a)’s preferences.
Our third and final equilibrium condition assumes that the marriage market is stable.
Using the definition of Gale and Shapley (1962), marriage stability imposes that marriage
matches satisfy the conditions of Individual Rationality and No Blocking Pairs. To formalize
the notion of Individual Rationality, let UaH and U
b
H represent female a’s and male b’s utility
in their marriage. These utilities follow from the above optimization program. Let us
further denote the female’s and male’s maximum attainable utilities as singles by UaS and U
b
S
respectively. In this respect, we assume that singles are also consumer-producer households
that follow the same two-step procedure as couples. Their production technologies, however,
depend only on their own time spent on agricultural labor (combined with land L and the
other input x), and they do not face an intrahousehold bargaining process (reflected by the
household maximizing a weighted sum of individual utilities) in the consumption step.
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Individual Rationality requires
UaH ≥ UaS and U bH ≥ U bS. (3)
Intuitively, Individual Rationality imposes that no female or male wants to exit their marriage
and become a single.




any possible realization of utilities for female a and male b if they formed a pair. Then, the
No Blocking Pair requirement imposes that







for i, i′ ∈ {a, b}, i 6= i′. (4)
In words, a marriage market allocation has No Blocking Pairs if no female a and male b are
both better off, with at least one of the two strictly better off, by remarrying each other
instead of staying with their current partners.
In what follows, we will quantify deviations from the Individual Rationality and No
Blocking Pair conditions by Individual Rationality (IR) and Blocking Pair (BP) indices,
which measure the degree of marriage instability. We will compute these indices under the
maintained assumptions that intrahousehold consumption allocations are Pareto efficient
and production allocations are profit maximizing. As indicated above, we will also show
how we can allow for deviations from exact profit maximizing behavior (due to technological
heterogeneity or productive inefficiency) in our empirical analysis.
3.3 Marriage stability: empirical conditions
To define our empirical conditions for a stable marriage allocation, we assume a data set D
that contains the following information for a given marriage market:
• matching function σ,
• time uses li, mi and hi of each individual i,
• wage wi of each individual i,
• consumption quantities (q(a,σ(a)), Q(a,σ(a))) of every matched couple (a, σ(a)),
• land quantities La, Lσ(a) and L(a,σ(a)) of every matched couple (a, σ(a)),
• land price z(a,σ(a)) of every matched couple (a, σ(a)),
• input quantity x(a,σ(a)) of every matched couple (a, σ(a)),
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• output quantity y(a,σ(a)) of every matched couple (a, σ(a)),
• nonlabor income n(a,σ(a)) of every matched couple (a, σ(a)).
We remark that the set D does not include information on individuals’ private consump-
tion; only the aggregate household quantities q(a,σ(a)) are observed, which is usually the case
for household data. The individuals’ private quantities will be treated as unknowns in our
empirical conditions for marriage stability.4 Next, in what follows we will assume that wages
and land prices remain the same when individuals exit marriage (and become single or re-
marry), so that divorce has no productivity effects. The assumption that land prices and
wages are perfectly observed is relaxed below (see Section 3.4). Finally, given that the data
set that we use below allows for identifying both individual and joint land holdings, we use
this information to reconstruct a lower bound on the individual incomes used in our restric-
tions. We assume that individuals keep their own land after divorce, whereas the joint land
(together with all other non-assigned nonlabor income) is shared endogenously. We remark
that our conditions for stable marriage would be readily adapted if information on individual
land holdings were not available.
Characterizing stable marriage. As explained in Section 3.2, we say that the data
set D is consistent with a stable matching if it allows the specification of individual utility
functions Ua and U b that represent the observed consumption behavior as Pareto efficient and
the observed marriages as stable. We use revealed preference conditions that are intrinsically
nonparametric, in the sense that they do not require an explicit (parametric) specification
of the functions Ua and U b. In particular, we obtain the following testable implications for
a stable marriage matching.5
Proposition 1 A necessary condition for the data set D to be consistent with a stable
matching σ is that there exist for each matched pair (a, σ(a)), a ∈ A,










b. and nonlabor incomes Na, Nσ(a) ∈ R+ for which Na + Nσ(a) = n(a,σ(a)) + x(a,σ(a)) +
z(a,σ(a))L(a,σ(a)),
such that the following constraints are met for all females a ∈ A and males b ∈ B:
4In our empirical application, part of the private consumption will be assignable to men and women (i.e.
individual expenditures on health, education and clothing; see Online Appendix OA1). Such information is





σ(a) . For ease of notation, we do not explicitly consider this refinement here.
5See the Appendix for the proofs of our results.
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i. the individual rationality restrictions
Na + z(a,σ(a))La + waT ≤ wala + q(a,σ(a))a +Q(a,σ(a)), (5)
N b + z(σ(b),b)Lb + wbT ≤ wblb + q(σ(b),b)b +Q
(σ(b),b),
ii. and the no blocking pair restrictions
(


















Moreover, a sufficient condition for the data set D to be consistent with a stable matching
σ is that, in addition, the inequalities (6) are strict for b 6= σ(a).
Restrictions (a) and (b) of Proposition 1 specify feasibility constraints that apply to the
unknown individual quantities and nonlabor incomes for the matched pairs. These restric-
tions are associated with the assumption that households choose Pareto efficient intrahouse-
hold allocations. Restrictions (i) and (ii) can be given a “revealed preference” interpretation
in terms of a stable marriage allocation. The inequalities (5) in requirement (i) impose,
for each individual male and female, that the budget constraints under single status (with
potential income Na + z(a,σ(a))La + waT for female a and N b + z(σ(b),b)Lb + wbT for male b)
do not allow buying a bundle that is strictly more expensive than the one consumed under














male b). Indeed, if this requirement were not met, then at least one man or woman would be
better off (i.e. could attain a strictly better bundle) as a single, which would mean that the
marriage allocation is not stable. A similar intuition holds for the no blocking pair restric-
tions (6) in requirement (ii). When evaluating the potentially blocking pair (a, b), we define
its available budget as the sum of the counterfactual (post-divorce) budgets of female a and
male b. This budget is compared to the cost of a bundle guaranteeing for both individuals













and at least the same public consumption (i.e. max{Q(a,σ(a)), Q(σ(b),b)}) as in their current
marriages.6 If (6) were not met, then both female a and male b would be better off (with
at least one strictly better off) by remarrying each other and, thus, the current marriage
allocation would not be stable. See also the Appendix for more details.
6We assume that children are captured by the public good, so that these are sufficient conditions for
both spouses to be able to afford child custody on divorce. Allowing child custody (and its associated cost)
to be spouse-specific would increase the attractiveness of divorce for the spouse who does not receive child
custody.
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Some remarks are in order. First, we treat the individuals’ post-divorce shares of nonla-
bor income (Na and N b in Proposition 1) as unknowns that are defined endogenously. Our
method basically considers the post-divorce sharing that makes the observed marriages as
attractive as possible, or, in other words, minimizes instability which is important to avoid an
upward bias of our empirical results in our reduced form exercise later on. A similar remark
holds for the unobserved allocation of the private goods (qa and qb). Next, and related to
this, for each solution of the unknown variables that satisfies the empirical constraints in the
proposition, we can construct utility functions Ua, U b and a Pareto weight µ that represents
the data in terms of a stable marriage allocation. In general, however, the solution to the
constraints in Proposition 1 will not be unique, which means that this revealed preference
approach typically obtains set identification of the structural components Ua, U b and µ.
We refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2011) for a detailed discussion on set iden-
tification in the context of the collective model of household consumption, which directly
extends to the current setting. These authors also explain the main differences between
set identification on the basis of revealed preference characterizations such as ours and point
identification that is typically pursued in the so-called differential approach to characterizing
collective consumption behavior (see, e.g., Chiappori and Ekeland, 2009).
Three further remarks are of a practical nature and pertain to bringing the characteriza-
tion in Proposition 1 to observational data. First, consistency of D with a stable matching




σ(a) and nonlabor in-
comes Na, Nσ(a) that satisfy a set of constraints that are linear in these unknowns. Therefore,
a convenient feature of the conditions in Proposition 1 is that they can be checked through
linear programming, which makes them straightforward to apply in practice. Next, as dis-
cussed in Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017a), by considering all possible
solutions to the rationalizability constraints in Proposition 1, we could set identify the shar-
ing rule, which captures how total household consumption is shared between the spouses.
Specifically, we could compute upper and lower bounds on the household’s resources shares
going to the individual spouses. Finally, as argued in Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2017b), the empirical requirement defining the sufficient condition for data con-
sistency with a stable marriage allocation is a very mild one that is easy to verify in practice.
Therefore, we will not explicitly discuss this empirical requirement in what follows.
Quantifying marriage instability. An important focus of our empirical analysis is on
marriage instability. As explained before, we quantify marital instability in terms of individu-
als’ consumption gains from divorcing and remaining single or remarrying. More specifically,
when an observed household is not satisfying our testable implications, we use our model to
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define two structural measures of instability: the Individual Rationality (IR) indices capture
how much better off (in consumption terms) individuals would be as a single person, and
the Blocking Pair (BP) indices measure how much better off individuals would be when
remarrying other partners in the same marriage market.
To operationalize these ideas, for each exit option from marriage (i.e. becoming single or
remarrying another potential partner) we quantify the minimal within-marriage consumption
increase that is needed to represent the observed marriage as stable with respect to the given
exit option (as characterized by the conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1). If a household
satisfies the original stability constraints, then there is no need for such a consumption
increase, and our stability indices that we introduce below will equal zero. In the other case
there will be a need for a strictly positive increase, which indicates how far the observed
behavior (with the original income levels) is from stable behavior. To put it differently,
the consumption increase measures the potential economic gain from divorce when choosing
a particular exit option and, therefore, we interpret it as revealing the degree of marriage
instability.
Formally, starting from our characterization in Proposition 1, we include an instability
index in each restriction of individual rationality (sIRa,∅ for the female a and s
IR
∅,b for the male
b) and no blocking pair (sBPa,b for the pair (a, b)). We replace the inequalities (5) by(
Na + z(a,σ(a))La + waT
)
− sIRa,∅ ≤ wala + q(a,σ(a))a +Q(a,σ(a)), (7)(
N b + z(σ(b),b)Lb + wbT
)




and the inequalities (6) by
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and we add the restriction 0 ≤ sIRa,∅, sIR∅,b , sBPa,b . The indices sIRa,∅, sIR∅,b and sBPa,b represent indi-
viduals’ consumption gains when choosing particular exit options from marriage: sIRa,∅ when
female a becomes single, sIR∅,b when male b becomes single, and s
BP
a,b when a and b remarry




a,b = 0 obtains the original (sharp) conditions




a,b correspond to larger deviations




















subject to the feasibility constraints (a) and (b) in Proposition 1 and the linear constraints
(7) and (8). This implies that we try to minimize the total economic gains related to divorce
in order to verify how close the observed data set is to a stable marriage market. By solving
(9), we compute IR indices for the Individual Rationality constraints (sIRa,∅ and s
IR
∅,b in (7))
and BP indices for the No Blocking Pairs constraints (sBPm,w in (8)). Correspondingly, for
each exit option, we can define an associated gain from divorce. In our application, we will
define “relative” divorce gains by setting out these gains as proportions of current household
income. In the next section, we will define a modified version of the objective (9) to address
empirical concerns related to unobserved input prices and cross-household heterogeneity in
technologies and productive (in)efficiencies.
3.4 Unobserved input prices and production inefficiency
Above we have assumed that prices of the inputs of the household production are observed.
In a setting where most households are farmers and only few work off-farm, observed wages
are missing or upward biased, while agricultural productivity is more important for economic
attractiveness but is not measured in the data. When prices and wages are not observed,
shadow prices can be used instead. To obtain shadow prices, we use the structural model
that we defined in Section 3.2. In particular, as in Chiappori (1997), we assume profit
maximizing behavior under constant returns to scale. In the spirit of Proposition 1, we
present a revealed preference characterization, which here means that it does not require an
explicit specification of the production technology (represented by the function F ).7 In what
follows, we will also show how we can account for deviations from exact profit maximization
(because of technological heterogeneity or profit inefficiencies) in our empirical analysis.
Let the true wages (wi for each individual i = a, b) and land prices (z(a,σ(a))) for each
matched pair (a, σ(a)) be unobserved. Then, we can define shadow wages and prices under
the identifying assumption of profit maximizing behavior. Specifically, we say that the data
set D is consistent with shadow profit maximization if we can specify a production function F
that represents the observed production behavior as profit maximizing under these shadow
wages and land prices. In other words, this identifying assumption allows us to obtain
individual-specific measures of labor productivity and a household-specific measure of land
productivity. The following result is an adaptation of Theorem 6 in Varian (1984) to our
particular setting.
7See, for example, Afriat (1972) and Varian (1984) for seminal contributions on this nonparametric
approach to analyzing efficient production behavior.
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Proposition 2 The data set D is consistent with shadow profit maximization if and
only if, for each matched pair (a, σ(a)) (a ∈ A), there exist shadow wages wa, wσ(a) ∈ R+
and a land price z(a,σ(a)) ∈ R+ that satisfy
0 = y(a,σ(a))−[
waha + wσ(a)hσ(a) + z(a,σ(a))
(






















The restrictions (10) and (11) require that there exist shadow prices such that the ob-
served input-output combination of each matched pair (a, σ(a)) achieves a profit of zero (see
(10)), which must exceed the profit for any household (a′, σ(a′)) (with a′ ∈ A) under the
same prices (see (11)). Note that this condition of zero maximum profit directly follows
from our constant returns to scale assumption. We can append these profit efficiency restric-
tions to the stability conditions above. As a result, our marriage stability analysis will use
shadow wages and land prices that are identified under the assumption of profit maximizing
household production. See also the linear program that we present below in (14).
Our empirical analysis will make use of two extensions of the characterization in Propo-
sition 2. The first extension pertains to the fact that our characterization in Proposition 2
only imposes that shadow prices should be non-negative. Obviously, this still admits shadow
prices that are unrealistic proxies of the true (unobserved) prices (e.g., prices that are in-
finitely high). To exclude such unrealistic scenarios, we impose lower and upper bounds on
possible prices. Specifically, we append the restrictions
wa ≤ wa ≤ wa, wb ≤ wb ≤ wb and z(a,σ(a)) ≤ z(a,σ(a)) ≤ z(a,σ(a)),
where wa, wb, z(a,σ(a)) ∈ R++ and wa, wb, z(a,σ(a)) ∈ R++ are predefined lower and upper
bounds. Specifically, from our data we computed a median observed wage per hour of hired
workers in the district. Based on plot characteristics and reported potential rent, we also
calculated a median rental income per acre for each village. In our empirical application the
lower bounds are then set to zero and the upper bounds to two times the respective median.
We refer to online Appendix OA1 for more details on our procedure to define lower and
upper bounds on shadow wages and land prices.
Our second extension pertains to the fact that the characterization in Proposition 2
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implicitly assumes that different households are exactly profit efficient and characterized by
a homogeneous production technology (defined at the marriage market level). Clearly, in
practice we need to account for unobserved heterogeneity in technologies and productive
(in)efficiencies across households (see, e.g., Udry, 1996). To do so, we introduce deviational
variables πa+, πa−, πa,a
′ ∈ R+ for each matched pair (a, σ (a)). These variables capture
possible deviations from the original (sharp) conditions in Proposition 2, which can thus be
explained as deviations from exact profit maximization under a homogeneous production
technology.8
Formally, in our profit characterization in Proposition 2, we replace the equality restric-
tion (10) by
πa+ − πa− = y(a,σ(a))− (12)[
waha + wσ(a)hσ(a) + z(a,σ(a))
(





and the inequality restriction (11) by
πa,a
















The variables πa+, πa−, πa,a
′
account for deviations from the zero maximum profit that
appears on the left hand side in the original conditions (10) and (11). That is, they capture
deviations from the assumption of profit maximizing behavior under constant returns to
scale with a homogeneous household technology.










. This implies that we replace the objective (9)


































subject to the constraints (a) and (b) in Proposition 1, the stability constraints (7) and (8)
and the profit maximization constraints (12) and (13). Because all constraints are linear





a+, πa− and πa,a
′
by
8Deviational variables are also used in the “goal programming” approach to deal with infeasible linear
programs.
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straightforward linear programming. Summarizing, the above minimization program looks
for optimal feasible values of unobserved individual quantities, shadow prices (including
wages) and nonlabor incomes in such a way that deviations from stability and profit maxi-
mization are minimized.
In the minimization program (14), the parameter α is a tuning parameter that represents
the “penalization” weight of the marriage instability indices relative to the technological
heterogeneity variables. By setting α = 10−6 in our empirical application, we essentially
implement a two-stage optimization process. In the first stage, we identify shadow prices as










), which allows us to grasp productivity differences
across individuals and land holdings. In the second stage, we compute the instability indices















because we use profit maximizing behavior as our identifying assumption to obtain shadow
wages and land prices (which are used to calculate our instability indices), we give it a
substantially higher weight in the specification of our objective function in (14) by setting α
to be very small.9
4 Data
Our data are drawn from the third Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS). We use
the baseline survey conducted in 2010 and the second wave in 2013, where approximately
one quarter of households were re-interviewed. Households were chosen randomly in both
waves, and both the baseline sample and the panel subsample were designed to be nationally
representative of the population of Malawi.10 We restrict our sample to rural, monogamous
households that engage in agriculture.11 This yields a sample of 8624 households in 2010, of
which 5943 were married. Of the married households, approximately one third (N = 1406)
are observed three years later. We allow singles to form potential blocking pairs with married
individuals, but our instability indices are only estimated for married individuals. Online
Appendix OA1 discusses the construction of the dataset in more detail.
A crucial component of our analysis is the specification of marriage markets, within
which individuals can potentially form blocking pairs. As stated earlier, marriages tend
9As a robustness check, we explored the impact of alternative values for α. This resulted in qualitatively
similar results for the shadow prices and the stability indices (see online Appendix OA3).
10In the baseline survey, 768 communities were selected based on probability proportional to size, within
which 16 households were randomly sampled.
11We use survey weights in all our descriptive statistics and also take into account the fact that the primary
sampling units are villages by clustering at the village level.
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to be local in Malawi. In the IHS dataset, approximately 45% of married individuals are
from the village they live in, while a further 25% are from another village within the same
district. We use this fact to guide our definition of marriage markets. In particular, we use
the GPS coordinates of villages to construct clusters of two to three geographically close
villages, which form a marriage market. We use the k-means unsupervised machine learning
algorithm, which partitions the data into k clusters using the squared Euclidean distance.
We set the number of clusters to 300, so that the number of households per cluster ranges
from 5 to 58, with the average number of households per cluster at 33.5. The fact that
we construct small marriage markets based on geographically proximate villages increases
the likelihood of encounters between individuals in these marriage markets. As households
are randomly sampled at the village level, the sample will be representative of the types of
individuals in a person’s marriage market. In this sense, although we do not observe the
complete population of each marriage market, we observe a representative subset of types.
We are implicitly assuming that the remarriage market is captured by these geographical
clusters; thus, it cannot be the case that individuals only remarry people in faraway villages,
for example, due to social stigma. Indeed, the social stigma of divorce is likely to be fairly
low in this setting, given the high divorce rate. Finally, the more individuals there are in
the marriage market, the more likely that there is a profitable new match. Thus, the size
of the marriage market can affect the values of marital instability and we address this by
controlling for marriage market fixed effects in our empirical analysis of divorce decisions
(see Section 6).
Table II describes the characteristics of our sample. On average, the household head
is middle-aged and 76% of household heads have no education. The average household
has approximately three children and almost two acres of land. Most consumption is non-
assignable, with 23% of consumption devoted to public goods and 2% devoted to the man’s
and woman’s assignable goods, on average. The primary component of non-assignable con-
sumption is food, which forms 64% of total consumption, on average. Clothing forms 3% of
annual consumption, while public consumption includes utilities and house-related expenses,
which form 14% of annual consumption, on average. All spending on children (education,
health, clothing) is subsumed in public consumption. Thus, the majority of our households’
budget is spent on food, with a further large share spent on housing and utilities.
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Table II. Summary statistics of rural, monogamously married households in 2010 IHS
Variable Mean Standard error
Age of head 40.407 (0.222)
Head has no education (0-1) 0.763
Head has primary education (0-1) 0.104
Head has secondary education (0-1) 0.124
Head has tertiary education (0-1) 0.009
Number of children 2.952 (0.029)
Land (acres) 1.945 (0.040)
Total consumption (’000s) 210.672 (3.535)
Public share of consumption 0.2293 (0.0020)
Private share of consumption, woman 0.0133 (0.0004)
Private share of consumption, man 0.0113 (0.0005)
Nonassignable share of consumption 0.7461 (0.0020)
Number of observations (N) 5943
Number of marriage markets 300
This table shows the average characteristics of the households in the 2010 estimating sample.
5 Estimation results of the structural model
In this section, we discuss the estimation results from the structural model. We estimate our
model using the first wave of the survey (2010), and reserve the second wave of the panel
(2013) for our out-of-sample prediction of divorces. In particular, the optimization program
in equation (14) in Section 3.3 yields several outputs: instability indices for each possible
pair in each marriage market; instability indices for each individual for the outside option of
being single; individual resource shares; deviational variables; and the budget components
(shadow wages, shadow land prices and individual nonlabor income). We present descriptive
statistics in Table III.12
We find that, on average, men have a significantly higher share of the household’s re-
sources than women. This is in line with the results obtained by Dunbar, Lewbel and
Pendakur (2013), albeit with a very different estimation strategy. Further, we find that
women have a significantly lower shadow wage than men, which is consistent with reported
12As we indicated above, our nonparametric characterization of household behavior under marital stability
obtains set identification (i.e. upper and lower bounds) of the unknowns in our structural model. The
descriptive statistics in Table III summarize the estimates that we obtain as outcomes of the optimization
problem in equation (14) when using the Tomlab solver for linear programming in Matlab.
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non-agricultural wages in the survey. Women also have significantly lower land income than
men, on average, which is partly driven by the fact that the average woman owns less land
than the average man. Nonlabor income is overall high for both men and women, and is
defined as the shortfall between income and consumption and leisure, so that high nonla-
bor income is driven by high leisure, low agricultural productivity, low land price and small
landholdings. In particular, reported leisure is very high in the survey, suggestive of overre-
porting, and is the most important contributor to the large average nonlabor income. These
observations are useful to bear in mind when we discuss our estimates of the relationship
between the outputs of our structural model and divorce in Section 6.2.1.
Next, the deviational variables capture deviations from our assumption of profit maxi-
mizing behavior under constant returns to scale with a homogeneous household technology.
To make them more easily interpretable, we express them relative to the observed aver-
age output at the village level. The fraction of non-zeroes and the reported average values
are relatively high. This reflects substantial unobserved technological heterogeneity across
households. Given the focus of our current empirical exercise, we do not investigate this
heterogeneity in more detail. We leave this as a potentially interesting avenue for follow-up
research.
Finally, for each individual, we define two Blocking Pair (BP) indices: the BPmax index
represents the individual’s gain associated with the most attractive remarriage option, and
the BPavg index gives the individual’s average gain from remarriage, across all possible new
pairs that this individual could form in their marriage market. The Individual Rationality
(IR) index measures the gain from divorcing and being single. All indices are expressed
relative to the household’s total income. For the ease of interpretation of our empirical
results we multiply the BP indices with 100.
Some interesting observations emerge. First, we estimate that 61% of women have a
profitable match in their marriage market, while fewer than 17% of men have a profitable
match. From the BPmax estimates we learn that, on average, women gain more by choosing
the most attractive remarriage option than men. However, our BPavg results reveal that
women’s gains from selecting the “average” remarriage possibility are generally lower than
men’s. This implies that women have many unattractive potential matches and some very
attractive potential matches, while men have mostly mediocre, somewhat attractive matches.
This asymmetry in gains from remarriage may be caused by unequal distribution of gains
to switching (i.e. unequal sharing of resources), heterogeneity in preferences (e.g., related
to expenditures on public goods) or productivity differences (i.e. different shadow prices).
These household-specific variables are all partly captured by our BP index. Importantly,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the attractiveness of the individual marriage market as a whole. Reniers (2003) discusses
the features of higher order marriages, and how they differ between men and women. He
finds that in higher order marriages, women are less likely to reside patrilocally/virilocally
(with the in-laws, which is considered disempowering), and are more likely to reside matrilo-
cally/uxorilocally (near their own families, which is considered benefical). This suggests that
at least on this one facet of marriage, women may benefit more, relative to men, in higher
order marriages. Another plausible reason for this pattern is that there is asymmetry in
the distribution of productivity across individuals. In particular, there may be more women
who have high productivities, but only a few men who are particularly productive. In fact,
Online Appendix OA2 shows an example of one marriage market in the data, where this
exact pattern is evident. If this is the case, then there will be many women that are po-
tentially attractive to other men, but only a few men that are attractive to (many) women.
Recall that the BP index requires identification of a pair where remarriage is beneficial for
both - therefore a low proportion of men with profitable BP matches can also indicate that
they themselves are not attractive to other females. This asymmetry in attractiveness (as
captured by productivities) by gender can also explain why women have more profitable
matches than men in the data.
In contrast, no women in our sample would prefer to be single over staying married, while
over 44% of men would prefer the single option. In the context of a frictionless marriage
market, this implies that the model omits unobserved costs of being single for men and
remarriage for women. At this point, we note that the absence of domestic non-agricultural
labor, which is currently subsumed in leisure both in the model and the data, may explain
these findings. Walther (2017) shows that virtually all domestic labor in Malawi is carried
out by women.13 This implies that, to a first approximation, we overestimate women’s leisure
and underestimate their domestic labor in the data, but measure men’s labor and leisure
fairly accurately. The impact of women’s domestic labor on their spouses is unambiguous:
they benefit. This implies that we will tend to underestimate the value of current marriages
for men, which may be the reason why we predict that a relatively large number of men would
prefer to be single over their current marriage. For women, the point is more nuanced: it
is not clear whether incorporating domestic labor would increase or decrease the value of
current marriages for women. This depends on their trade-off between leisure and the public
good produced by their domestic time (see Donni, 2008, for more discussion). We return to
this point in our discussion of our baseline results in Section 6.2.
Turning next to summary statistics of divorce between 2010 and 2013, Table IV shows
13Table 2 in Walther (2017) contains detailed information on time use from a different survey: on average,
women spend around 4 hours per day on domestic labor, while men spend around 0.2 hours per day.
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that 11.7% of households divorce between the two waves of the survey.14 Of those women
with known marital status in 2013, there is a similar number of single women and remarried
women, while most men remarry. Finally, Table V compares the characteristics of couples
who divorce with those who do not. We find that both men and women who divorce have
higher values of all instability indices in 2010, and we present a rigorous analysis of this rela-
tionship in Section 6.2. The table also shows that households who divorce have significantly
lower total consumption, fewer children and less land. Among couples who are still married,
the household head is older on average, which falls in line with standard intuition that poor
matches are dissolved early on.
Table IV. Changes in marital status between 2010 and 2013, Malawi IHS
N (%) Married Divorced - remarried Divorced - single Total
Couples 1242 164 (11.7%) 1406
Women 1242 74 (5.4%) 64 (4.6%) 1380
Men 1242 84 (6.2%) 21 (1.6%) 1347
This table shows summary statistics of marital status changes between the 2010 and 2013 waves of the
Malawi IHS. Only households observed in both waves are included.
14There are some divorced households in 2013 where one of the spouses could not be re-interviewed; this is
why the total number of divorced men or women with known marital status is fewer than the total number
of divorced households.
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Table V. Summary statistics of characteristics of couples who divorce and do not divorce
between 2010-2013
Divorce Do not divorce
Mean Standard error Mean Standard error P-value
BPmax, woman 3.70 (0.49) 3.25 (0.33) 0.19
BPmax, man 0.72 (0.29) 0.59 (0.13) 0.66
BPavg, woman 0.14 (0.02) 0.12 (0.01) 0.19
BPavg, man 0.32 (0.20) 0.21 (0.04) 0.58
IR, man 0.019 (0.004) 0.017 (0.002) 0.50
Age of head 35.35 (1.07) 40.97 (0.55) 0.00
Number of children 2.49 (0.16) 3.13 (0.06) 0.00
Land (acres) 1.72 (0.16) 2.06 (0.07) 0.03
Total consumption (’000s) 203.29 (12.51) 237.04 (9.44) 0.01
Number of observations 164 1242
Number of marriage markets 117
P-values indicate whether the two means are statistically significantly different from each other.
6 Divorce and the marriage market
In this section, we demonstrate the empirical relevance of our model by showing that our
structurally defined instability indices are correlated with individual and household charac-
teristics that are plausible measures of individuals’ outside options in the data, and that
they predict future divorce and remarriage.
6.1 What drives instability?
From our discussion above we know that the BP index is increasing in the potential income on
divorce, which itself is driven by the sum of the individual’s nonlabor income and potential
labor income. Potential labor income depends on an individual’s productivity, which we
estimate from our model of agricultural production. On the other hand, the BP index is
decreasing in the value of the current marriage, which depends on (the share of) private and
public goods consumption and on leisure, also valued at an individual’s productivity. All
these aspects are influenced by individual and marriage market characteristics that are not
explicitly used in the estimation of our model through the linear program in equation (14).
Therefore, it is a valuable exercise to provide correlational evidence that our BP indices are
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associated with these characteristics in the way that we would expect. For example, distance
to road or urban centre is likely to be correlated with some measure of productivity of the
individual. It is likely that age of the spouse captures a similar effect: younger spouses may
be more productive than older spouses on the land, or older spouses may provide agricultural
expertise and therefore higher productivity with age.
In particular, we estimate the correlation between the instability indices and the age and
education of the spouses, the number of children they have, as well as dummy variables
for whether they have the same age and the same education (intended to capture the value
of assortative mating). For characteristics of the marriage market, we include the number
of churches (to capture religiousness), the distance to the nearest road, the distance to the
nearest urban centre, the fraction of females with at least primary education, the fraction
of school-age children currently in school, the fraction of adults who say they can read the
local language, as well as the number of households in the marriage market.
The equation we estimate is
sji,m = α0 + α1Hi,m + α2Xm + εi,m, (15)
where sji,m is the instability index j (j = BPmax,BPavg, IR) of individual i living in
marriage market m, Hi,m are characteristics of individual i’s household, and Xm are char-
acteristics of individual i’s marriage market. We report our estimates in Table ?? in Online
Appendix OA3.
We find that the more educated the household head (which is the husband in virtually
all cases), the lower are the wife’s BP indices (i.e. her remarriage possibilities are less
attractive). This estimated effect is monotonically increasing in the education level of the
household head. For example, a woman living in a household where the head has primary
school education has an average BPmax index that is 47 percentage points lower than a
comparable woman where the head has no education. Recall that the BP indices are defined
relative to household income, so that this coefficient captures a decline in the ratio of 0.47.
On the other hand, the education of the household head is not correlated with the BP indices
of the husband. Instead, we find that he has stronger outside options when he is older (likely
because this is correlated with accumulated wealth). Children in marriage significantly
reduce the value of all outside options, with a larger effect on women than men.
For the marriage market characteristics we observe a relationship between connectedness
and stability: marriage markets that are far away from roads and urban centres are more
stable. A one kilometer increase in the marriage market’s distance to the nearest road
reduces the wife’s average BPmax by 5.1 percentage points, while the same increase to
the nearest urban centre reduces this index by 0.3 percentage points on average. Next,
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the rate of child schooling is negatively (though insignificantly) correlated with both men’s
and women’s blocking pair indices. This indicates that high rates of child schooling are
potentially stabilizing for marriage markets. Finally, as expected, larger marriage markets
are associated with larger values of the BPmax indices and the husband’s IR index.
To further improve our understanding of what drives our stability indices, we conduct
a related exercise to assess the proportion of variation accounted for by each explanatory
variable. In particular, we estimate the partial R2 obtained by dropping each explanatory
variable from the full model in Table ??. These estimates in Table ??, Online Appendix
OA3, show that up to 2.2% of the variation in the wife’s instability indices is explained by the
household’s proximity to infrastructure (roads and urban centres). The size of the marriage
market cluster is also important for both the wife’s and husband’s instability indices, which
is consistent with the fact that a bigger marriage market increases the likelihood that a
profitable new match can be found.
Next, we also estimate the partial R2 obtained when we include the budget components
in the estimation of equation (15): individuals’ estimated individual nonlabor incomes and
the shadow wages, shadow land income and shadow fertiliser investment. Table ??, Online
Appendix OA3, shows that nonlabor income trumps most other variables in terms of ex-
planatory power, accounting for up to 12.9% of the variation in men’s instability indices and
3.7% of the variation in women’s instability indices. Wages are also important, explaining
7.6% of men’s outside options when single. Only the size of the marriage market cluster and
distance to road remain important explanatory variables after including the budget compo-
nents. These estimates show that the value of individuals’ blocking pairs hinges on their
nonlabor income and potential labor income on divorce, which is what the structural model
would lead us to expect.
6.2 Divorce
6.2.1 Main results
We now present the empirical analysis of divorce. In particular, we estimate whether our
structural measures of the value of the remarriage market, and of being single, can predict
future divorces. Note that there is no a priori reason to expect an empirical association
between our measures of instability and future divorces, as no information from the 2013
wave was used in the estimation of the structural model. Hence, this provides an out-of-
sample test of our model. We estimate a linear model of divorce between 2010 and 2013,
with the BP indices of the spouses and the IR index of the husband as covariates (recall
that the IR index is zero for all wives). We include marriage market fixed effects, and
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also control for all household-level variables reported in Table ??, as they covary with the
instability indices and potentially also with divorce probability. Marriage market fixed effects
will capture characteristics that matter for overall divorce propensity such as the size of the
marriage market, as well as the geographical heterogeneity in descent practices that is known
to exist in Malawi (Walther, 2018). The equation we estimate is




i′,h,m + β3Hh,m + β4µm + εi,m, (16)
where dh,m is a dummy variable that equals one if household h in marriage market m divorces
between 2010-2013, and zero if they remain married, sji,h,m is the instability index j of spouse
i in household h in marriage market m, sji′,h,m is the instability index j of spouse i
′, Hh,m
are household characteristics and µm are marriage market fixed effects. We estimate these
equations separately for j = BPmax and j = BPavg, but include j = IR in both of these
equations. Standard errors are clustered at the marriage market level. The estimates are
reported in Table VI.
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Table VI. OLS regressions of divorce between 2010-2013 on instability indices in 2010 and
other control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Divorced in 2013
BPmax (woman) 0.014 0.014
(0.006) (0.006)
BPmax (man) 0.001 0.001
(0.030) (0.030)
IR (man) 0.846 0.864 -0.006 0.005
(2.504) (2.491) (1.644) (1.639)
BPavg (woman) 0.519 0.521
(0.143) (0.146)
BPavg (man) 0.019 0.019
(0.026) (0.025)
N 1406
R2 0.126 0.126 0.129 0.130
Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports OLS regressions. All regressions include marriage
market fixed effects, the age of the husband and wife in 2010, fixed effects for the education of the
household head and the number of children the household had in 2010. Columns (2) and (4) also control
for dummy variables indicating whether the couple are within two years of age of each other, and whether
they have the same level of education.
We find that the instability indices have significant predictive power for future divorce,
particularly for measures of the value of the wife’s remarriage market. In regression (1), a one
percentage point increase in the wife’s maximum gain from remarriage raises the probability
of divorce by 1.4 percentage points on average. This is a sizeable effect, as the annual divorce
probability is approximately 8.5%. In regression (2), we control for measures of assortative
mating: dummy variables that equal one if the spouses have the same education level and
the same age (±2 years). The coefficient on BPmax is unchanged. In regression (3), we
repeat the first specification (without assortative mating variables) but replace BPmax with
BPavg, and we find that a one unit increase in the average remarriage gain for the wife, as a
proportion of her household’s income, raises divorce probability by 51.9 percentage points.
Note that the impacts of a unit change in the maximum and average gains from remarriage
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on divorce probability are not directly comparable to each other, as the levels of BPmax and
BPavg are different (see Table III). In particular, a one-unit increase in BPavg, the average
value of an individual’s outside options, would represent a substantial improvement in that
individual’s marriage market. In terms of standard deviations, the effect sizes are as follows:
a one standard deviation increase in the wife’s BPmax index increases divorce probability
by 0.15 standard deviations, while a similar increase in the wife’s BPavg index increases
divorce probability by 0.79 standard deviations. Overall, we thus find that our measures of
the value of the woman’s remarriage market are predictive of divorce.
We also examine how sensitive our estimates are to the inclusion of the explanatory vari-
ables. Table ?? in Online Appendix OA4 reports the successive inclusion of the explanatory
variables in the estimates in Table VI. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the estimates
for BPmax. Column (1) only includes the instability indices, and consistent with Table V,
these are not statistically significantly different between households who divorce and do not.
Column (2) introduces marriage market fixed effects, which yield a statistically significant
and larger positive coefficient on the wife’s BPmax, indicating that there is significant un-
observed variation in divorce probability across marriage markets that is captured by the
instability indices in Column (1) and affects the estimation of the coefficients. In fact, once
we successively include all other, household level, control variables in Columns (3)-(6), the
coefficients on the instability indices do not change in a noticeable way from those in Column
(2). This exercise demonstrates that the instability indices pick up crucial household-level
variation in divorce probabilities, once marriage market variation is accounted for by the
cluster fixed effects.
We find no significant associations between the measures of husbands’ outside options,
and divorce. Thus, economic gains to divorce and remarriage matter for the women in
our sample, but not the men. In Malawi, women marry young and divorce often. In the
demographic literature, it has been argued that women in Malawi use marriage and divorce
to improve their economic situation; for example, women are less likely to live in their
husband’s village in higher order marriages, which is considered empowering (Reniers, 2003).
Men, on the other hand, are more likely to remarry younger women, and hence plausibly are
motivated by the fecundity, rather than economic circumstance, of their potential spouse.
This intuition can explain why we observe that the economic value of a woman’s marriage
market matters, while that of the man’s does not.
It is important to note that Tables IV and VI show different relationships. Table IV is a
level effect, in the sense that it shows that the average man is more likely to be remarried
following a divorce than the average woman; Table VI is a slope effect, in the sense that it
shows that the average woman is more likely to respond to an economically attractive outside
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option with a divorce than the average man. These two findings are not inconsistent with
each other: when a man decides to divorce, he finds a new spouse relatively easily, while a
woman faces more difficulty. However, this does not illuminate on what drives men to divorce
in Malawi, which according to our results are not economic considerations. Instead, women,
though less likely to remarry overall, are much more likely to divorce for an economically
attractive new partner. This is further confirmed by our results in Table VIII below.
We consider alternative mechanisms that could explain our empirical results. First, we
explore whether the absence of data on domestic labor could be a potential source of omitted
variable bias. In particular, as domestic labor is currently subsumed in leisure, higher un-
observed values of domestic labor will tend to reduce the value of an individual’s BP index.
This is likely to only be the case for women, as men in Malawi contribute very little to
domestic labor (see the discussion in Section 5). Whether the omission of domestic labor
(and hence its appearance in the error term) can explain the estimated positive coefficients
on BPmax and BPavg in the regression of divorce probability depends on the correlation
between domestic labor and divorce probability. We estimated this correlation using a dif-
ferent dataset that contains information on domestic labor, the Malawi Longitudinal Study
of Families and Health, and find a statistically insignificantly estimated coefficient of about
zero. This suggests that domestic labor is unlikely to explain the positive coefficient that we
estimate.15
Second, we consider that the measure BPmax is likely to be sensitive to who is sampled
from the marriage market, more so than BPavg. An alternative measure that captures the
top end of the remarriage distribution, but that is less sensitive to sampling, is the 95th
percentile of an individual’s BP indices (BP95 ). These results are displayed in Table ?? in
Online Appendix OA4 and the coefficients on BP95 are consistent with those on BPmax in
Table VI; a one unit increase in BP95 increases divorce propensity by 4.6 percentage points,
which predictably lies between the coefficients on BPavg and BPmax.
In Table ?? in Online Appendix OA4, we estimate the specifications in Table VI using
a logit regression model, where we report marginal effects at means. The marginal effect of
BPavg is similar in magnitude to the average affect in Table VI, while the estimated effect
of BPmax is virtually unchanged. The inclusion of a dummy for the existence of polygamy
in the village does not affect the significant estimated effect of the wife’s instability index on
15The Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health (MLSFH) is run by the University of Penn-
sylvania and contains detailed information on time use and marital status over time. Using the waves of
data available for 2004 and 2006, we estimate the correlation between divorce in wave t + 1 (2006) and a
wife’s domestic labor in wave t (2004). Domestic labor includes reported time spent on cooking, washing
clothes and cleaning on a typical day, and we condition on total hours accounted for in the time diary, total
number of children and region fixed effects. We estimate a coefficient of 0.001 (s.e. 0.005) on domestic labor,
suggesting that our estimates in Table VI are unlikely to be biased by the omission of domestic labor.
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divorce, but we do find that the existence of polygamy increases the overall probability of
divorce (results not reported for compactness).
Next, we show that the estimated effect of the BP indices cannot be washed away by
controlling for the husband’s share of household resources and the share of public consump-
tion in the household. Within our specific model, the latter two variables provide the main
incentives to marry. To investigate their effect, we sequentially add both variables to our
specifications in columns 2 and 4 of Table VI, yielding the results in Table VII. As we ex-
plained in our discussion of Proposition 1, our revealed preference approach only allows us to
set identify the intrahousehold sharing of consumption. Therefore, in our regressions we used
our estimates that are summarized in Table III for the husband’s resource share. Note that
the newly added variables in Table VII are “bad controls”, in the sense that they themselves
are determined by choices (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). However, we do not interpret this
exercise in a causal way. Rather, our goal is to investigate how the relationship between our
instability indices and divorce propensity is affected by these variables. Interestingly, we find
that our estimated effect of the BP indices is not sensitive to the inclusion of the variables.
This is not surprising: although an individual’s share of household resources and the level
of public consumption affect the economic gains of remarriage, they are only part of the
story. Since the BP indices are intrinsically an equilibrium concept, they incorporate not
only these household-specific variables, but also the particular structure of the attractiveness
of individuals’ marriage markets.
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Table VII. OLS regressions of divorce between 2010-2013 on instability indices in 2010,
control variables, share public consumption and male’s resource share from the structural
model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Divorced in 2013
BPmax (woman) 0.014 0.014
(0.006) (0.006)
BPmax (man) 0.001 0.001
(0.030) (0.030)
IR (man) 0.901 0.868 0.040 0.038
(2.501) (2.528) (1.646) (1.657)
BPavg (woman) 0.518 0.518
(0.146) (0.157)
BPavg (man) 0.019 0.019
(0.026) (0.025)
Male share 0.054 0.046 0.058 0.057
(0.150) (0.167) (0.149) (0.167)
Share public consumption -0.014 -0.001
(0.114) (0.114)
N 1406
R2 0.126 0.126 0.129 0.130
Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports OLS regressions. All regressions include marriage
market fixed effects, the age of the husband and wife in 2010, fixed effects for the education of the
household head, the number of children the household had in 2010, and dummy variables indicating
whether the couple are within two years of age of each other, and whether they have the same level of
education.
6.2.2 Divorce: Remarriage or remaining single?
An important implication of the way that the instability indices are defined is that the BP
index measures the attractiveness of a potential new match in the marriage market, while
the IR index measures the attractiveness of being single. Therefore, we should observe these
associations in the data. In order to show that this is the case, we estimate the relationship
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between the BP indices and two separate outcomes: divorce and remarriage, and divorce and
remaining single. In particular, we define two indicator variables: the variable Remarried
takes the value one if an individual divorced and remarried between 2010 and 2013, and
zero otherwise (including if they remained married), while Single takes the value one if the
individual divorced but was not remarried in 2013, and zero otherwise. We observe this
information for most but not all individuals in the survey, and are able to construct these
variables separately for men and women. As in the main estimates in Table VI, we control
for marriage market fixed effects and household characteristics. The results are in Table
VIII. For compactness we report the estimated effect of BPmax here; the same regressions
with BPavg are in Table ?? in Online Appendix OA4.
Table VIII. OLS regressions of marital status in 2013 on instability indices in 2010 and other
control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marital status of woman Marital status of man
Remarried Single Remarried Single
BPmax (woman) 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
BPmax (man) 0.004 0.005 0.010 -0.005
(0.012) (0.019) (0.022) (0.007)
IR (man) 0.021 0.479 0.013 0.649
(1.105) (1.524) (1.685) (0.473)
N 1380 1380 1347 1347
R2 0.113 0.105 0.119 0.094
Standard errors in parentheses. This table reports OLS regressions. The dependent variable Remarried
takes a value of one if the person has divorced and remarried by 2013, and zero otherwise. The variable
Single takes a value of one if a person has divorced but has not remarried by 2013, and zero otherwise.
All regressions include marriage market fixed effects, the age of the husband and wife in 2010, fixed
effects for the education of the household head and the number of children the household had in 2010,
and dummy variables for whether the couple are within two years of age of each other, and whether they
have the same level of education.
The results are consistent with the premise that the BP indices measure the attrac-
tiveness of the remarriage market. In particular, a higher value of the wife’s BP index is
associated with a significantly higher probability that the wife divorces and remarries in
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the next three years, instead of remaining married (regression (1)). The index also predicts
divorcing and being single (regression (2)); however, the coefficient is around one half of the
size of the coefficient in regression (1). Indeed, not everyone who divorces with the intention
of remarrying will manage to do so. Interestingly, the wife’s BP index is also predictive
of the husband divorcing and remarrying, consistent with men preferring to remarry rather
than remain single, even if they did not trigger the divorce. The husband’s IR index does not
affect the probability of either divorce status, which is consistent with its weak significance
in Table VI, suggesting that the IR index does not fully capture the gains to being single. In
terms of magnitudes, we find that a one unit increase in the wife’s best gain from remarriage,
as a proportion of household income, raises the probability that the wife has divorced and
remarried, relative to all other marital states, by 1.1 percentage points. It also increases the
probability of being divorced and single by 0.6 percentage points, and raises the probability
of the husband having remarried by 1 percentage point. These magnitudes are similar to
those in Table VI.
In Online Appendix OA4, we present the estimates of a multinomial logit model of
marital status in 2013 (see Tables ?? and ??). Consistent with the OLS results, we find
that an increase in the wife’s BP index is associated with increased odds of divorcing and
remarrying by 2013 for both the husband and wife. In particular, a one unit increase in
BPmax is associated with a 6.2% higher risk of the woman and 11.8% higher risk of the
man being divorced and remarried, compared to the base category of remaining married.
Additionally, an increase in the husband’s BP index is associated with higher odds of the
husband divorcing and remarrying. Neither BP index is associated with significantly changed
odds of divorcing and being single, compared to remaining married.
6.2.3 Interactions between the remarriage market and other drivers of match
quality
As a further exercise, we explore the role of other drivers of marital surplus in divorce, and
how they interact with the estimated effects of our economic measures of the remarriage
market. We focus on other drivers of match quality and attractiveness that have been well-
documented in the literature: age, education, and assortative mating in these factors (see,
for instance, Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2014, for a recent overview). We have already
controlled for these measures in the main results; here, we explore heterogeneity of our main
effects with respect to these variables. In this sense, we go some way towards characterizing
match quality as consisting of both an economic value, as captured by our BP indices, and
value from non-economic characteristics. We expect that characteristics that improve the
value of the current marriage, such as the number of children, will reduce the predictive
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impact of BP indices on divorce, as these characteristics can compensate spouses for lower
“economic attractiveness”. We also explore heterogeneity of the main effects with respect
to the local sex ratio (defined as the ratio of males over females in a given village, hence
exploiting variation between villages within a marriage market). The results for BPmax are
in Table IX; similar estimates for BPavg can be found in Table ?? of Online Appendix OA4.
We find precisely estimated differences in the gradient of BPmax with respect to age,
having the same age as the spouse, and the sex ratio. In particular, the estimated effect
of the wife’s BP index is decreasing with her age, suggesting that being older makes it
more difficult to find an alternative partner. Interestingly, we find a significant estimated
negative interaction between the husband’s BPmax and being of the same age, suggesting
that husbands value assortative mating on age. This does not contradict the estimates in
Table ??, as those regressions focus on absolute values, while here we look at age gaps: it
can be that husbands value both young wives (in absolute terms) and also wives of a similar
age to them.
Next, in regression (3), we examine the interaction between the sex ratio and the esti-
mated effect of remarriage options on divorce. For a sex ratio equal to one, an increase in
the wife’s BPmax index of one unit increases the probability of divorce by approximately 7.3
percentage points. The more men there are, relative to women, the stronger the estimated
effect of the wife’s potential gains from remarriage on divorce probability. This is a rational
response: if there are more men relative to women in the population, the likelihood of a prof-
itable remarriage is greater. The asymmetry between men and women in this response may
be due to a situation where women look for economically better matches, while men look for
more attractive wives. This would mean that the same variable measuring the availability
of men vs women (the sex ratio) would not have the same heterogeneous effect on their
response to a high BP index. Further analyzing different consideration sets is an interesting
avenue for further research.
Finally, we summarize the other, less precisely estimated effects. The interaction term
between the number of children and the spouses’ BP indices is negative, suggesting that
having more children reduces the effect of the attractiveness of other outside options. This
is consistent with the observation that divorce occurs less among couples who have children.
Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction between having the same education level, and the
BP indices, is negative, which suggests that assortative mating on education can compensate




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Divorce is a widespread phenomenon with potentially large welfare effects on all parties that
are involved. The study of divorce in the economic literature has been largely dominated by
the role of economic shocks (with the exception of studies that link intrahousehold choices
to divorce decisions, such as Voena, 2015, Bronson, 2015, and Reynoso, 2018). We argue
that the marriage market has a crucial role to play in the decision to divorce. We have
defined structural measures of individuals’ outside options on the marriage market and shown
that they are significant (out-of-sample) predictors of future divorces. These measures are
based on a collective model with consumption and agricultural production embedded in a
marriage market. We quantify marital instability in terms of Individual Rationality (IR)
and Blocking Pair (BP) indices, which capture spouses’ consumption gains to remarrying
another individual in the same marriage market (BP index) and to being single (IR index).
We estimate this model on data drawn from a household survey in Malawi, which has rich
information on consumption and production, as well as information on marital status changes
over three years. Our key results are as follows. We find that a 1 percentage point increase
in the wife’s most attractive outside option, relative to her household income, is associated
with a 1.4 percentage point higher probability of divorce over the following three years, and
increases the probability that she has divorced and remarried by 1.1 percentage points. We
find no significant associations between the value of the husband’s remarriage market and
subsequent divorce, which is consistent with men and women valuing economic characteristics
in their partners to different extents (Reniers, 2003). The estimated relationship between the
wife’s remarriage market and divorce cannot be explained by a linear combination of wages,
nonlabor income and land income, indicating that intrahousehold sharing of consumption is
the key driver of this relationship. Finally, we find that this estimated effect interacts with
other characteristics that affect match quality. In particular, it is dampened by the age of
the spouses, and by a shortage of men, relative to women, in the marriage market.
Our findings show that divorce in Malawi is driven, at least partly, by the economic
considerations of spouses. In addition, our empirical results validate the set-up of our theo-
retical model, akin to an out-of-sample test. More generally, they show the value-added of
adopting a Beckerian approach that analyses marriage decisions through the lens of a struc-
tural model of household decision making. Further, as agricultural productivity is a key
determinant of outside options for households reliant on production, our model is applicable
to other contexts as well.
Notwithstanding the good performance of our model when applied to the consumer-
producer economy of rural Malawi, its static framework will likely be restrictive in other
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contexts. Indeed, introducing uncertainty about future marriage prospects and non-myopic
individual preferences would make the model richer. Examples of parametric dynamic mod-
els of matching and divorce can be found in Voena (2015), Bronson (2015) and Reynoso
(2018). Adams, Cherchye, De Rock and Verriest (2014) provide a revealed preference analy-
sis of dynamic collective household behavior, but without explicitly modeling the individuals’
outside options on the marriage market. This study may constitute a useful starting point
for developing a dynamic extension of our analysis. We leave this exercise to future work.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Necessity. To prove that the empirical conditions stated in Proposition 1 are necessary for
the data set D to be consistent with a stable matching σ we apply the revealed preference
argument that underlies Proposition 1 of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2017a), but now adapted to our particular setting. Particularly, our conditions use infor-
mation on (i) the bundles of goods consumed by individuals in their current match, (ii) the
cost of these bundles in two alternative scenarios outside the observed match (i.e. as single
(for the individual rationality requirement) and with some other potential partner (for the
no blocking pair requirement)) and (iii) the available budget in these two counterfactual
scenarios.
As explained in the main text, we assume that individuals are endowed with utility
functions Ua(la, qa, Q) and U
b(lb, qb, Q). For each matched couple (a, σ(a)), our data set D
contains la, lσ(a) and Q(a,σ(a)) and the aggregate private consumption q(a,σ(a)). To reconstruct










(a,σ(a)) (i.e. condition (a)). For every observed
match, this results in the individual consumption bundle (la, q
(a,σ(a))
a , Q(a,σ(a))) for individual
a and (la, q
(a,σ(a))
σ(a) , Q
(a,σ(a))) for individual σ(a).
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Next, in our labor supply model the price of an individual’s leisure is the individual’s
wage, and the prices of the Hicksian private quantity q(a,σ(a)) and the Hicksian public quantity
Q(a,σ(a)) are equal to one. We use this price information to compute the consumption cost
of the within-marriage bundles in the two out-of-marriage scenarios. For the first scenario,
if female a and male b would become single, they would have to bear the full cost of the
public good to consume exactly the same quantity. When adding the cost of leisure and the
private Hicksian quantities, this gives a total cost of wala + q
(a,σ(a))
a + Q(a,σ(a)) for female a
and wblb + q
(σ(b),b)
b +Q
(σ(b),b) for male b.
For the second scenario, if the potentially blocking pair consisting of a and b would be
matched, they would need the quantity max{Q(a,σ(a)), Q(σ(b),b)} of the public good to guaran-
tee that both a and b consume at least the same amount as in their current match. Similarly
to the first scenario, when adding the cost of leisure and the private Hicksian quantities, this












+ max{Q(a,σ(a)), Q(σ(b),b)} for the
potentially blocking pair (a, b).
Restrictions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1 compare these consumption costs with the avail-
able budget in the two counterfactual situations.16 For each scenario, this available budget
has three components. The first component is the potential labor income of each individual,
i.e. waT for female a and wbT for male b. The second component is the nonlabor income
associated with the individuals’ private land holdings. These private land holdings La and
Lb are evaluated at the land prices z(a,σ(a)) and z(σ(b),b), which generates the private land
values z(a,σ(a))La for female a and z(σ(b),b)Lb for male b . These two first budget components
are observed at the individual level, which means that we can assign these incomes to re-
spectively a and b in the counterfactual scenarios. This assignability does not hold for the
third budget component, which captures the remaining (non-assignable) nonlabor income,
i.e. the sum of (1) nonlabor income n(a,σ(a)), (2) the value z(a,σ(a))L(a,σ(a))) of the house-
hold’s joint (non-assignable) land holdings and (3) the value x(a,σ(a)) of other input used
for agricultural production. To reconstruct the individual incomes of a and σ(a), we have
to consider all possible decompositions Na and Nσ(a) that satisfy the adding-up restriction






As a final step, the individual rationality restrictions (i) in Proposition 1 state that
a necessary condition for marital stability is that these individual budgets cannot strictly
exceed the cost of the bundles consumed by the individuals in their current matches, which
16We remark that our production assumption of profit maximization under constant returns to scale yields
zero (maximum) profit. This implies that (1) total input value (used in our budget calculations) equals the
value of the generated production output, and (2) there is no additional production profit (or loss) term to
be included in the available consumption budgets.
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gives
Na + z(a,σ(a))La + waT ≤ wala + q(a,σ(a))a +Q(a,σ(a)),
N b + z(σ(b),b)Lb + wbT ≤ wblb + q(σ(b),b)b +Q
(σ(b),b).
If these conditions were not met for some individual, then this individual would be better
off by living alone for any possible specification of the individual (continuous, concave and
monotonically increasing) utility functions. For example, the individual as a single could
compose a consumption bundle with strictly more of each consumed good.
A directly analogous argument holds for the no blocking pair restrictions (ii) in Proposi-
tion 1. When evaluating the potentially blocking pair (a, b), we now compare the sum of the
counterfactual budgets for female a and male b to the cost for a bundle guaranteeing at least
the within-marriage consumption quantities for these two individuals. In this case, marital
stability requires the inequality
(

















Sufficiency. Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017b) introduced the Weak
Axiom of Revealed Stable Matchings (WARSM) to define sufficient empirical conditions for
a stable marriage allocation. Reformulating this WARSM for our setting gives exactly the
conditions stated in Proposition 1. This shows that the data set D satisfies the empirical
conditions in Proposition 1 if and only if it satisfies WARSM. Finally, Corollary 1 in Cherchye,
Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017b) states that the WARSM defines a sufficient
condition for the data set D to be consistent with a stable matching σ as soon as all the
inequalities in our condition (ii) are strict for the unmatched pairs (i.e. the pairs (a, b) with
b 6= σ(a)).
Proof of Proposition 2
The result is an adaptation of Theorem 6 of Varian (1984) to our specific setting. In par-
ticular, we follow Chiappori (1997) by assuming profit maximization under constant returns
to scale and exogenously given input and output prices. Let us start by assuming that the
input prices of land (i.e. z(a,σ(a))) and labor (i.e. wa and wσ(a)) are observed. Given that we
assume a production technology with constant returns to scale, maximum attainable profit
must equal zero. This defines the equality restriction (10) for each observed match (a, σ(a)))
in Proposition 2.
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Next, profit maximizing behavior requires for every observed match (a, σ(a)) that, for the
prices faced by (a, σ(a)), there does not exist a different input-output combination that yields
higher profit. For a homogeneous production technology associated with a given marriage
market, this yields the inequality restriction (11) in Proposition 2 for each combination of
observed matches (a, σ(a)) and (a′, σ(a′)). Intuitively, it says that (a, σ(a)) cannot attain a
higher profit by adopting the input-output combination of (a′, σ(a′)). Varian (1984, Theorem
6) has shown that consistency with these two requirements is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the data to be consistent with profit maximizing behavior under a constant
returns to scale production technology.
Finally, since we do not observe the input prices of land and labor, we simply need that
there exists at least one possible specification of shadow land prices and wages that makes
the data consistent with the profit maximization restrictions (10) and (11).
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